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 1 
1 Introduction 
Technology generally moves forward faster than the law. This in turn logically leads to 
problems effectively controlling new technologies so that unwanted behaviour is 
discouraged. There have been many attempts by the courts in common law countries to 
apply old laws to these new situations, even where it requires a certain amount of judicial 
creativity to make the old law fit the new situations1
 
. An obvious example of this process 
has been the application of an almost forgotten head of action to unauthorised computer 
access. This is the American lead doctrine of cyber trespass, expanded from the old law on 
trespass to chattels. This gives computer system owners an action in tort when their 
systems have been accessed without authorisation. It enables them to receive compensation 
for any damage caused. However this has not been without controversy. The aim of this 
thesis will be to discuss whether or not the US law on cyber trespass should be 
incorporated into the English legal system, where it is yet to be developed in the same way. 
As a necessary part of evaluating the suitability it is important to look at alternative ways 
that unauthorised access can be governed, for instance using the criminal law, a different 
action in tort or contract, or creating a new civil offence designed specifically to deal with 
these situations. 
There have been a few different activities that have lead to the US courts developing the 
law on cyber trespass. The original cases dealt with spam and internet activities such as 
screen scraping. However, more recently there has been a move to use it as a response to 
malware and spyware along with the use of the restrictive Digital Rights Management 
Systems which are currently being used by the digital media industry, especially computer 
games publishers. In this thesis I will take Digital Rights Management Systems (DRMS) as 
a concrete example of where cyber trespass could come into play. More specifically I will 
                                                 
1 For example see Lessig (2006) for a discussion on the US attempts to re-interpret the Fourth Amendment 
of the US Constitution when wire tapping became possible. Chapter 9 pg 157 
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look at the issues surrounding DRMS used to protect computer games. This will enable me 
to come up with some real conclusions about the necessity or attractiveness of 
incorporating this into the body of English law rather than keeping the discussion at a broad 
theoretical level.  
 
1.1 Method 
1.1.1 Focus 
 
This piece of work will concentrate on the law in England and America. For the current 
cyber trespass laws I will have to look at American law as this is where it has been created 
and currently the only jurisdiction where such judicial creativity has occurred.2
 
 I will look 
at the current English law regarding trespass to chattels, comparing this with the general 
requirements under US law. Knowing the state of play before cyber trespass came into 
existence will enable me to look closer at whether it would work in English law. The other 
area of law that I will look at in depth is the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and show that this 
Act’s provisions may provide an alternative, more tailor made, solution to the problem 
caused by DRMS such as those that I will look at. At times this piece of work will also 
mention other areas of law, for example contract law, further torts, and the laws relating to 
intellectual property, especially the law on Copyright. All these laws will be the law 
applicable to England, but may be English law or European law as incorporated by the 
English system.  
1.1.2 Structure 
 
To start off this piece of work I will give a brief introduction to DRMS and show how the 
problems they cause can lead to damage and thus a legal remedy being available. This will 
enable me to keep my discussions on cyber trespass and trespass to chattels more focussed 
                                                 
2 Wong (2007) pg 91. This is further discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 3 
from the outset. I will then go on to look at the cyber trespass law in detail; this will 
necessarily start with a comparison of the general rules that govern trespass to chattels in 
each jurisdiction. It will then look at the American law on cyber trespass as it has evolved 
to be. At the end of this section I will come to a conclusion over whether English law 
would be wise to adopt such a law. This conclusion will include both a general opinion 
over the quality of the law itself and then a more specific answer to the question of whether 
English law, with all its peculiarities, could and should successfully incorporate such a 
doctrine. In the final section I will look at alternative laws that have the potential to work 
better in the situation that I am discussing. 
 
1.1.3 Approach 
 
Although this thesis focuses partially on Digital Rights Management Systems (DRMS) this 
is not a piece of work on intellectual property law. It is firmly grounded in unauthorised 
access to computer systems and the potential liability this can attract. I am looking at 
DRMS as an issue in their own right without concentrating on what they are protecting. 
Although this will be mentioned in passing in chapter 2. 
 
There is a paucity of secondary literature dealing with the issues at hand. Trespass to 
chattels has been discussed quite a bit since its inception at the beginning of the 21st 
century. But there hasn’t been much discussion about it being exported to other 
jurisdictions, nor its applicability to DRMS. As far as I can tell there has been no 
discussion of the possible issues surrounding the use of cyber trespass where there is no 
physical connection between the two parties. So, to facilitate my analysis of the law I have 
relied heavily on the primary legal sources. I have used the growing body of case law as 
my point of departure for the discussion on cyber trespass in chapter 3. This necessarily 
follows the normal progression of case law as used by many other academics when 
describing the creation of the law. Chapter 4 is based mainly on statutory law, namely the 
Computer Misuse Act. Where such primary sources are unavailable I have utilised the 
 4 
leading textbooks on the subject. This is the case with the discussion of trespass to chattels 
under English law, which, as I describe, is very poorly represented in primary law. 
 
Other academics analyses will be used, but due to the freshness of my particular subject the 
conclusions that I come to are my own. This cannot be a piece of work built wholly or 
substantially on others’ analysis, but on the primary legal sources themselves. 
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2 DRMS 
2.1 Background 
 
Piracy is a real and increasing threat to all forms of digital entertainment media, be it 
music, films or computer games. Representatives from these Industries have never been 
shy in outlining the effect this is having on the livelihoods of the employees in these 
industries. They maintain that the main threat comes from the internet and the ability to 
copy and share files with relative ease. To safeguard creativity and the cultural benefits 
creativity provides they are unanimous in their desire for more protection.3 However, the 
actual effect of digital piracy is very hard to ascertain. There have been attempts to quantify 
the damage to the industries in question, but due to the nature of the beast it’s impossible to 
come up with an exact assessment4
 
.  
To combat this threat the industries have needed to strike a difficult balance between 
protecting their intellectual creations and not alienating their law abiding customer base. 
The choices that have been made have, to a certain extent, changed customer preferences. 
No longer do users simply buy their digital media for the cheapest price, but many actively 
                                                 
3 For example see the entire published catalogue of Jack Valenti’s (who was the president of the Motion 
Picture Association of America for some 38 years) opinions on the threat of piracy. Also see the MPAA’s 
website for their views: <http://www.mpaa.org/piracy.asp>.  
4 The much publicised figures of $250billion monetary losses and 750,000 job losses, which can be found on 
the US Chamber of Commerce website <http://www.uschamber.com/ip>, have no apparent method in their 
calculation. In fact no-one seems to know where the numbers actually come from 
<http://blogs.wsj.com/numbersguy/the-mysterious-provenance-of-piracy-stats-437/>. The Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA) has had to rectify one of its statistics as there was human error; the 
incorrect figure was 44% of piracy happened on college campuses whereas the “correct” figure was actually 
15%. This mistake led to the MPAA lobbying for colleges to filter campus internet connections 
<http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080122/18164639.shtml>.  I won’t go further into this as it is beyond 
the scope of this work. 
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seek out the most liberal anti-piracy measures they can as these give the user more freedom 
over the product they have purchased5. Nowhere is this more true than with customers 
buying computer games, there have been a number of games which have had disappointing 
sales figures and customer reviews due to the protection which has been invoked by the 
publisher.6
 
 
I will be concentrating on efforts to protect computer games and how these can fall foul of 
the law, most notably trespass to chattels. The computer game industry can be split into two 
sections, console games and PC games7. I will be concentrating on the issues surrounding 
PC games. PC games are more susceptible to unlawful copying due to the inherent nature 
of the PC. Consoles such as Microsoft’s Xbox or Nintendo’s Wii are designed specifically 
for playing video games. They have been created in such a way that makes piracy almost 
impossible, or at least unattractive. You won’t find a copy function on a console, nor any 
way to write to a disc. Even though the new breed of consoles are internet ready and 
official content can be downloaded for free or at a cost8 the ability to upload and download 
pirated games is unavailable. The proprietary nature of the platform means that it is very 
hard to create programs to enable such features as copying and sharing data. On the other 
hand copying and disseminating information are at the heart what a PC is for9
 
. Couple this 
to the openness of the platform and the relative ease of creating programs and applications 
that run on them (such as cracks and hacks for protected programs) makes them a much 
more susceptible target for piracy. 
Computer games publishers have had to attempt to find the balance between protecting 
their creations and keeping their customers happy. This balance is possibly even harder for 
computer games than for other media. There is more opposition to the measures taken by 
                                                 
5 For example consumers purchasing DRM free music from Apples iTunes even though it is more expensive 
than the normal music tracks protected by Apples Fair Play DRMS, or even upgrade their current protected 
music for a fee, see <http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/02itunes.html>.  
6 One of the most notable is “Spore” released by Electronic Arts in September 2008. This will be discussed in 
more detail below. 
7 Throughout this piece when I say PC I will mean PCs and Apple Macs.  
8 For example using Xbox Live services or the Wii’s market place. 
9 Made clear by the original Apple Slogan attached to their Macs “Rip, Copy, Burn” 
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computer games developers to protect their products than there have been for digital music 
downloads. The following four criteria can go some way towards explaining the opposing 
views that make the balancing act so hard: 
 
• Production Costs: A computer game costs substantially more to produce than a 
typical music album, for example Spore is estimated to have cost EA in the region 
of USD$35million to develop (not including marketing or sales costs)10. This 
means the company will need better sales figures to recoup that money and start 
making profit. Compare this with figures of between USD$125,000 and 
USD$300,000 for producing a “popular album”11. Film production costs for 
blockbusters are huge but outweighed by the box office sales.12
• Expected Sales: The best selling PC game in history is The Sims produced by 
Electronic Arts, this has shipped 16million copies worldwide
 
13. There have only 
been four games to have broken the 10 million mark, namely The Sims, The Sims 
2, World of Warcraft, and StarCraft.14 Contrast this to sales figures for music 
albums. The leading seller worldwide being Thriller by Michael Jackson with 
estimated sales of 109 million. There are over sixty albums with worldwide sales of 
over 20 million15
• Retail Price: Computer games retail at a far higher rate than music and a higher 
price than films (typically £30 to £40 for a PC game compared to £8 to £10 for a 
music album and £15 to £20 for a DVD) so the incentive to download an illegal 
copy is increased.  
 which is more than any PC game has ever sold. DVD sales are 
less than with most music and games sales, but again these sales are secondary to 
the box office sales. 
                                                 
10 <http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/12/technology/copeland_spore.fortune/index.htm> 
11 Vogel (2007)  pg 162 
12 For highest grossing films see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_highest-grossing_films>, and for 
most expensive films see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_most_expensive_films>.  
13 <http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2005/feb/1114806.htm> - these figures are from the release on feb 
4th 2000 until 2005. However further sales will have been greatly reduced by the subsequent release of the 
sequels The Sims 2 and The Sims 3. 
14 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_best-selling_PC_video_games>  
15 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_best-selling_albums_worldwide>  
 8 
• Computer Users’ Protectiveness: Computer games affect a user’s equipment more 
than other digital media. Whereas music and video files on a computer are only 
saved as files which are read by a media player, computer games, when installed, 
affect a far greater part of the system. Computer games dig deeper into the users’ 
equipment and have the ability to affect it in unknown ways. The owners of 
computer systems will therefore be more selective when it comes to purchasing 
computer games and can be easily put off by anything which they see as either 
effecting their systems performance, or their control over it. 
 
There are two main approaches that computer game developers have been using to protect 
their products. They can either opt for software or hardware based Digital Rights 
Management Systems (DRMS) which protects the computer game software by restricting 
the actions of the user. The alternative is using an online registration system which can 
allow a product to be registered and used by a limited number of user accounts which are 
protected by passwords. Developers can use one or other of these, or a combination of the 
two.  
 
This piece of work will discuss the DRMS option and will highlight this method using a 
current system as an example. This will put the discussion in some sort of real context and 
enable me to draw some real conclusions from the experiences of the discussed ideas rather 
than keeping the work hypothetical. I will use the SecuROM system as an example of a 
commonly used DRMS. This is a program which has caused some controversy over its 
scope and legality and will provide an example of DRMSs at their very strongest.  
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2.2 Digital Rights Management Systems 
 
“Technological protections in the digital age take several forms, but all seek to 
provide a means for content owners to effectively dictate the permissible access to, 
and uses of, a work.”16
 
 
DRMS are pieces of code which restrict the use of a digital file in conjunction with the 
rights holder’s wishes17
 
. They are commonly attached to files protected by intellectual 
property law to enforce the rights holder’s rights. Typical actions that DRMS restrict are 
copying, burning to CDs and with digital music files synchronising to multiple portable 
devices. However, they can be used to restrict almost any action that the purchaser could do 
with the file, whether those actions are illegal or not. Some well known DRMSs are Fair 
Play used by Apple to protect its protected music files available over iTunes and the CSS 
system which is commonly used to protect the contents of DVDs, stopping the DVD from 
being ripped to a computer and then distributed over the internet. 
There has been some controversy over the use of DRMSs and the rights which they are 
being used to uphold.18
 
 They have the ability to protect far more rights than intellectual 
property law was ever designed to protect. As Lawrence Lessig puts it in his book Code v2:  
“An important point about copyright law is that, though designed in part to protect 
authors, the control it was designed to create was never to be perfect. As the 
Supreme Court noted, copyright “protection has never accorded copyright owner 
complete control over all possible uses of his work.”19
                                                 
16 Loren (2002) pg 134-5 
 Thus, the law grants only 
particular exclusive rights, and those rights are subject to important limitations, 
such as “fair use,” limited terms, and the first sale doctrine. The law threatened to 
17 A more specific definition is impossible. Technology is always moving forwards and the types of protection 
invoked is continually changing. 
18 For some examples of these controversies see Adams (2006). 
19 Sony v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) 
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punish violators of copyright laws—and it was this threat that induced a fairly high 
proportion of people to comply— but the law was never designed to simply do the 
author’s bidding. It had public purposes as well as the author’s interest in mind.”20
 
 
DRMS have gone beyond that, they can now protect intellectual property perfectly. Fair 
use can be programmed out of a digital work (it is in fact much harder to program it into a 
work as fair use is subjective and can only be decided on a case by case basis). The first 
sale doctrine is also being eroded by the use of DRMS. Some systems only allow a product 
to be registered to a limited number of user accounts or to be installed on a limited number 
of machines. This makes resale either less valuable or worthless if the restrictions on the 
license have been used up. To a certain extent this has lead to many digital products being 
protected more by contract law than by copyright law. Most digital files will come with a 
comprehensive license agreement which sets out what the user may and may not do with 
the product. This means that they can easily contract out of exceptions to copyright which 
have been allowed for in legislation.21
 
 
The code nature of DRMSs means that they work in a different way to law based systems. 
Copyright and other intellectual property laws generally work ex post. That is to say that 
the law will become involve when a breach has occurred, the rights holder will likely be 
entitled to monetary compensation and the pirate may face other penal sanctions depending 
on the seriousness of the offence. Code based DRMS theoretically make it impossible to 
breach the rights holders rights in the first place, that is they work in an ex ante fashion. 
They are designed not to let such a breach occur in the first place. The law based system 
allows for a certain amount of wiggle room when it comes to enforcing rights whereas code 
based systems totally remove all possible discretion which can come from judicial 
decisions. 
  
                                                 
20 Lessig (2006) pg 179 
21 There are some exceptions to actions that can be contracted out of. These are contained in the European 
Directives which I will mention later. 
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DRMS are not 100% secure right now. This has lead to a kind of arms race between 
computer game publishers and pirates. The publishers must try to keep at least one step 
ahead of the pirates and utilise stronger and stronger protection. However all the evidence 
suggests that they are losing this battle with the pirates. DRMS are susceptible to hacking. 
Commonly computer games which are protected by a DRMS have their protection cracked 
and pirated copies available within weeks; in some case within hours, or even before the 
game is officially released22. Therefore to protect the intellectual property better there have 
been many moves to strengthen the protection of the DRMS itself as well as the game. 
These protections go further than the copyright that the DRMS program would 
automatically acquire being, as it is, a computer program worthy of copyright protection. In 
the EU the protection of computer protection is governed by the Software Directive from 
199123. Article 7(1)(c) of the directive provides protection against commercial methods of 
circumventing DRMS. This has been incorporated into English law in s296 of the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 198824. Further European instruments such as the 
Information Society Directive25
 
 protect other forms of DRMS to a higher standard, but do 
not apply to computer software. They make it illegal to actually circumvent a DRMS rather 
than only commercialising a circumvention device. The provisions from this directive have 
been incorporated into English law in s.296ZA – s.296ZF of the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988. Given the subject of this thesis a further discussion of anti-circumvention 
provisions isn’t necessary. 
 
 
                                                 
22 For example The Sims 3 was available 2 weeks before release :<http://www.edge-online.com/news/the-
sims-3-leaked-online>.  
23 Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs 
24 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (C. 48) 
25 Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society 
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2.3 SecuROM 
 
“SecuROM is the fastest growing and most effective copy protection system for CD-
ROM and DVD-ROM”26
 
 
SecuROM is a DRMS used by many computer game companies to protect their intellectual 
property from pirates. As can be seen from above it is advertised as the most effective and 
fastest growing such system. It is currently being used by many companies, the most 
notable being Electronic Arts (EA), Ubisoft, and Codemasters. Some of the most popular 
games that use the SecuRom system are: 
• Spore (EA) 
• The Sims 2 expansion packs (from Bon Voyage and onwards)(EA) 
• Fifa 09 (EA) 
• Race Driver Grid (Codemasters)27
 
 
SecuROM advertises itself as being capable of protecting from the three main types of 
piracy, namely 1 to 1 copying of a disc, the use of emulation tools which are programs that 
try to bypass copy protection, and the use of cracks which are modified applications with 
the copy protection removed.28
 
 
According to the SecuROM website the system achieves this level of protection by 
including a unique “uncopyable electronic keycode”29 within the fabric of the CD or DVD 
itself when it is manufactured rather than after, which is the case with many other similar 
systems. This along with a software based authentication system allows access to the 
encrypted data on the disc. “The authentication mechanism is entirely key-less, meaning no 
serial numbers, stickers or artwork modification is required.”30
                                                 
26< http://www.securom.com/> 
 This is different to 
numerous other systems for copy protection which require a CD-Key be entered upon 
27 For a full list of games utilising the SecuRom system see: 
<http://reclaimyourgame.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45&Itemid=11> 
28 <http://www.securom.com/solution_general.asp> 
29< http://www.securom.com/solution_concept.asp> 
30 See above no 29 
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installing the game, this key is usually printed either at the back of the user manual or on a 
separate sheet inside the game case.   
 
The SecuROM system also gives the rights holder a large amount of scope over how they 
want to protect their game. The system enables three basic options each which can be fully 
customised. The rights holder can decide to use a disc based system whereby the CD or 
DVD is authenticated either upon every use, the first use, or after a certain number of uses 
or a selected period of time. There is also a time based system which can limit the time an 
application is used, or finally a usage based system which can limit the number of times a 
system can be used. 
 
However, there is no mention on the website of the most controversial aspect of the 
SecuROM system. That is the way it installs itself on the computers of the computer game 
users. The program installs itself in the kernel of the operating system: 
 
“[T]he kernel is the central component of most computer operating systems. Its 
responsibilities include managing the system's resources (the communication 
between hardware and software components). As a basic component of an operating 
system, a kernel provides the lowest-level abstraction layer for the resources 
(especially memory, processors and I/O devices) that application software must 
control to perform its function. It typically makes these facilities available to 
application processes through inter-process communication mechanisms and system 
calls.”31
 
 
Generally there is no warning that this is going to happen32
                                                 
31< http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernel_(computing)> 
. When this is the case the 
program is installed without any authorisation from the systems owner. It is this which can 
lead to an action under trespass to chattels which I will discuss later in this piece. 
32 See the later discussion about the EA lawsuits relating to this system for more details. 
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This means that when installed on a computer system SecuROM is put straight at the top of 
the hierarchy of programs, even higher than the user themselves. All this without asking for 
or gaining permission from the owner of the computer system to be installed. When the 
owner of a system removes a game from their system which uses SecuROM the SecuROM 
program itself will not be removed. In fact there is no easy way of removing the application 
from the system. Either the user must download another program to remove SecuROM or 
follow a long and complex process which, if done incorrectly, could damage the system 
due to the location of SecuROM in the kernel.33 All of this is very reminiscent of the Sony 
Rootkit scandal which culminated in 2005 where Sony BMG included a copy protection 
system on its audio CDs to protect their intellectual property when the CDs were used on a 
PC34. It was discovered by Mark Russinovich35 that the system Sony were using had many 
similarities to spyware36 and was effectively uninstallable without risking further damage 
to the computer system. The legal ramifications were never fully felt as Sony BMG settled 
the case by providing replacement CDs for all users who purchased infected products37. 
They have also released a program for uninstalling the DRMS.38
 
 
2.3.1 The EA Cases 
 
Electronic Arts (EA) are the biggest computer game developer and publisher in the world. 
They have created some of the most notable computer game releases of recent time, for 
example The Sims franchise and the more recent game, Spore. They are one of the 
                                                 
33 Process available here: 
<http://reclaimyourgame.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=68&Itemid=40>  
34 Scheier (2005)  
35 His research was published in a blog entry which can be found at: 
<http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/10/31/sony-rootkits-and-digital-rights-
management-gone-too-far.aspx>.  
36 The encyclopaedia Britannica defines spyware as a: “type of computer program that is secretly installed 
on a person's computer in order to divulge the owner's private information, including lists of World Wide 
Web sites visited and passwords and credit-card numbers input, via the Internet.” Available at: "spyware." 
Encyclopædia Britannica. 2009. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 3 Sept 2009 
<http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9471406>.  
37 Information of the settlement can be found here: <http://www.eff.org/cases/sony-bmg-litigation-info>  
38 Available at: <http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp/english/updates.html>  
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companies that have opted to use SecuROM as their primary means of protecting some of 
their intellectual creations. The release of the computer game Spore created a certain 
amount of controversy. Spore was released on 4th September 200839 after a delay of well 
over a year. It is marketed as “your own personal universe. You can create and evolve life, 
establish tribes, build civilisations, sculpt worlds, and explore the cosmos.”40 When the 
game was released users were restricted to 3 installations of the game, this was increased to 
5 installations after a number of complaints. The main complaint being what EA 
considered to be a new installation. Upgrading a computer could cost the user an 
installation, as could obviously buying a new computer. Sometimes, due to installation 
problems user used their entire limit without being able to use the game. Installations could 
be recovered by contacting EA and pleading your case to be allowed another. Now it is 
possible to do this online. 41 There was wide disappointment over the eventual product that 
was released mainly due to the use of SecuROM. For example users only gave it 4.5 out of 
10 on the metacritic review website, compared with 84 out of 100 for professional critic 
reviews.42
 
 The difference between critic ratings and user ratings shows that the use of a 
draconian DRMS is unpopular with computer users and may show evidence that the use of 
them can affect consumer preferences.  
On 22nd September 2008, just over 2 weeks after the release of the game, Melissa Thomas 
filed a law suit against EA for the use of the SecuROM system on a number of grounds.43
                                                 
39 <http://eu.spore.com/whatisspore/platforms.cfm> 
 
This law suit has been voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff so that it can be consolidated 
with a number of other cases which have been filed against EA for the same reasons. These 
have included a suit in relation to the computer game Mass Effect, and the Spore Creature 
Creator. I will now look at the case which Melissa Thomas filed against Spore. I will use 
this case as it was the first of the suits brought and is the most comprehensive with regards 
to the grounds on which it is brought.  
40 See above number 39 
41 <http://eu.spore.com/whatisspore/article.cfm?id=32381> 
42< http://www.metacritic.com/games/platforms/pc/spore?q=spore>. Figures correct as of 31st August 
2009, although user score subject to change as more reviews are added. 
43 Melissa Thomas v. Electronic Arts, inc. Case 5:08-cv-04421-PVT 
 16 
 
The crux of the cases is the inclusion of the SecuROM system as a “separately installed, 
stand alone, uninstallable DRM program”. And that this program isn’t disclosed anywhere 
in the literature which accompanies the game, either in the instruction manual or the End 
User License Agreement (EULA). In the pleadings for the case there was a list of fifteen 
legal questions. The most pertinent being: 
 
“A. Whether EA fails to disclose the presence of an additional program on the 
Spore gamedisk; 
B. Whether EA should have separately disclosed the presence of an additional 
DRM program on the Spore gamedisk, and the extent and nature of that program; 
C. Whether defendant should have disclosed, and is liable for its failure to 
disclose, prior to the purchase of the SecuROM program, the precise details and 
nature of the program, where and how it would install, and how it would operate, 
prior to any installation of the program; 
D. Whether defendant should have disclosed, and is liable for its failure to 
disclose, prior to the installation of the SecuROM program, the precise details and 
nature of the program, where and how it would install, and how it would operate, 
prior to any installation of the program; 
E. Whether the defendant should have obtain [sic] informed consent from the 
user, prior to the installation of the SecuROM program; 
F. Whether defendant concealed crucial details concerning the presence, operation, 
function, and uninstallability of the SecuROM DRM program to the class and the 
public; 
G. Whether defendants actions in concealing crucial details concerning the 
presence, operation, function, and uninstallabilty of the SecuROM DRM program 
were likely to deceive the public;  
... 
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M. Whether by its conduct, defendant has trespassed on the computers of all 
persons who installed the Spore computer game;”44
 
 
The first seven questions all deal with the same legal issue, namely disclosure and 
authorisation. These are important aspects of most computer crimes, especially those which 
I will be dealing with in this piece of work. Question M looks at trespass to chattels which 
will be the main discussion of this thesis. 
 
Along with the pleadings in the lawsuit there have been many reports of the SecuROM 
system effecting users’ computers in ways that is far from desirable45
 
. It is a necessary 
feature of such systems to be running in the background whenever the computer is 
functioning. It is always working to make sure that the user isn’t doing anything that the 
rights holder doesn’t want them to do with their program. This inevitably uses computer 
processing power which will affect the computer’s performance. If a computer is using part 
of its processing power to do one thing then it cannot use that power to perform other 
functions that the user may ask it to do, therefore slowing the computer down. The extent 
will depend on the power which the computer has, if it has a large processing capacity then 
the effect will be negligible, however, with older, less powerful machines the effect will be 
far greater.  
There have also been reports of DRMS stopping perfectly legal functions from working. 
For example in his paper “A Cost Analysis of Windows Vista Content Protection” Peter 
Gutmann outlines the collateral damage that emanates from Microsoft’s attempts to protect 
premium content in its Windows Vista operating system: 
 
                                                 
44 The brief for this case is available at <http://www.courthousenews.com/2008/09/23/Spore.pdf>  
45 For a list of different problems that have stemmed from the installation of SecuROM visit 
<http://reclaimyourgame.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52&Itemid=13>. Problems 
that have been experienced include: disablement of CD/DVD drives; wrongly identifying legal software as 
emulation software and then disabling it; or interfering with the users internet firewall. 
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“Vista's content protection mechanism only allows protected content to be sent over 
interfaces that also have content-protection facilities built in. Currently the most 
common high-end audio output interface is S/PDIF (Sony/Philips Digital Interface 
Format). Most newer audio cards, for example, feature TOSlink digital optical 
output for high-quality sound reproduction, and even the latest crop of 
motherboards with integrated audio provide at least coax (and often optical) digital 
output. Since S/PDIF doesn't provide any content protection, Vista requires that it 
be disabled when playing protected content [Note E]. In other words if you've sunk 
a pile of money into a high-end audio setup fed from an S/PDIF digital output, you 
won't be able to use it with protected content. Instead of hearing premium high-
definition audio, you get treated to premium high-definition silence. 
 
Say you've just bought Pink Floyd's “The Dark Side of the Moon”, released as a 
Super Audio CD (SACD) in its 30th anniversary edition in 2003, and you want to 
play it under Vista (I'm just using SACD as a representative example of protected 
audio content because it's a well-known technology, in practice Sony has refused to 
license it for playback on PCs). Since the S/PDIF link to your amplifier/speakers is 
regarded as insecure for playing the SA content, Vista would disable it, and you'd 
end up hearing a performance by Marcel Marceau instead of Pink Floyd.”46
 
 
There are also problems when it comes to video output as well as audio. Vista will disable 
any output that isn’t protected, for instance component outputs won’t work. Nor will most 
HDMI outputs even if they are sold as being protected. Premium content is generally HD 
or Blu Ray content which to gain the best results should be viewed using a much larger 
monitor than are generally used with computers. The most common method of using HD 
content on a computer would be to hook the computer up to a large HD ready Television by 
either a component cable or a HDMI cable. But if this doesn’t work then having a HD or 
Blu Ray compatible computer for viewing movies is basically pointless (even more so if it 
is on a 15” laptop where the difference between HD and normal quality is negligible.) 
                                                 
46 Gutmann (2007) available at <http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/vista_cost.html>  
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Unsurprisingly this feature of Vista is not advertised to users as it can be seen as punishing 
perfectly honest users from using functions which add to the viewing or hearing 
experience. 
 
The problems surrounding the SecuROM system are even worse. Vista only stops HD 
playback of video and sound, but leaves the computer in general working order. SecuROM, 
on the other hand, has been known to affect the deep down functionality of the users’ 
computer. For instance it can view having more than one CD or DVD drive as enabling 
piracy and therefore disabling one of them. Excluding laptops most computers sold 
nowadays have multiple disc drives as standard. There have been other reports of 
computers ceasing to function altogether after the installation of SecuROM.47
 
 It is these 
problems which will act as the point of departure for my discussion on trespass to chattels, 
and then of possible alternatives from other legal areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 These are, however, only reports of such things happening. The cause of the computer problems that 
some have experienced may not be down to the SecuROM software, but merely a coincidence that the 
problems started when they did. However, there are such a large number of reports that I would say that it 
is more than mere coincidence. See no. 45 above for concrete examples of such problems. 
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3 Trespass to Chattels 
 
I will now dive into the murky depths of the law of trespass to chattels. This is a very old 
area of common law that has experienced something of a renaissance in The United States 
of America. However, the renewed interest in this area has not taken off in other common 
law countries yet48
 
. This is because there have been no cases brought to the courts of any 
other jurisdiction yet where the claimant has relied on such a claim. This part of this piece 
of work will be split into three main parts. I will firstly look at the state of the law on 
trespass to chattels under English law, comparing and contrasting this to the general law in 
America before it was used in the digital environment. Then I will look at how this almost 
forgotten law has been reincarnated to deal with computers in America, discussing whether 
this has been a good thing or not. Finally I will discuss whether or not it would be 
appropriate for the English courts to follow the American example and stretch trespass to 
chattels to include computer related claims. I will also apply the law to the examples in 
question on the presumption that the English courts would choose to borrow cyber trespass 
from the US. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Following extensive case and literature searches I feel safe in my conclusion that this is the case. I have 
not been able to find any mention of trespass to chattels being used anywhere but the US. This is also 
backed up by Wong (2006) pg 91 
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3.1 The state of the law 
3.1.1 English law 
 
Trespass to chattels (or trespass to goods)49 is a very scarcely used law in the English legal 
system.50 Because of this there is some ambiguity over the actual definition of the law and 
what is needed to succeed in a claim. However what is sure is that a trespass is “[a] 
wrongful direct interference with another person or with his possession of land or goods... a 
direct and immediate interference with person or property, such as striking a person, 
entering his land, or taking away his goods without his consent.”51
 
 So trespass to chattels is 
an immediate and direct interference with property.  
What is not clear, however, is whether it is actionable per se or if there is some need for 
damage to be proved. Even in the leading works on tort law there is disagreement over this 
requirement. For example in Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts they say that “A 
trespass to goods is actionable per se without any proof of actual damage. Any 
unauthorized touching . . . is actionable at the suit of the possessor of it, even though no 
harm ensues”52. In the case of Leitch v. Leydon53 Lord Blanesburgh stated that: “The 
wrong to the appellants in relation to that trespass is constituted whether or not actual 
damage has resulted there from either to the chattel or to themselves.”54
                                                 
49 The terms “trespass to chattels”, “trespass to goods”, and “trespass to property” seem to be 
interchangeable with trespass to chattels seemingly the favoured term in the US and trespass to goods the 
favoured term in England. I will generally use the term trespass to chattels as this is the term generally used 
in conjunction with cyber trespass as it is of American origin. 
 However this 
would appear to only be dicta as trespass formed no part of the judgement in the end and 
50 Following a simple case search on a law database it came up with 41 reported cases dealing with “trespass 
to goods”. In most of these cases trespass to chattels was merely an incidental element and not much 
discussed. The main issues in the cases were anything from Landlord and Tenant to criminal and civil 
evidence and procedures.  
51 "trespass n." A Dictionary of Law. by Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A. Martin. Oxford University Press 2009 
Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  Oslo University.  31 August 
2009  <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t49.e4041> 
52 Heuston & Buckley (1998) pg  95 
53Leitch v. Leydon [1931] AC 90  
54 Leitch v Leydon per Blanesburgh LJ, at 106 
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the discussion on English law was not technically applicable to this Scottish case. Winfield 
& Jolowicz on Torts55 concurs with this interpretation of the law. The Oxford Law 
Dictionary also defines trespass as being actionable per se56. On the other hand others such 
as Markesinis and Deakin are less clear over the lack of a damage requirement and hold 
that damage may be required depending on the facts of the case: “It is not altogether clear 
whether liability is based on damage or whether the tort is actionable per se. It may be 
possible to distinguish between deliberate touchings, which are actionable per se, and 
unintended or careless acts of touching, which require damage.”57
 
 Looking at the various 
sources I would suggest that trespass to chattels doesn’t require damage to be proved. All 
three forms of trespass, land, property (goods, chattels), and the person come from the 
same legal ancestry. There is no evidence that the courts have restricted the use of trespass 
to chattels to scenarios where damage was caused only, in fact the evidence suggests the 
contrary, following the opinion of most of the textbooks and Lord Blanesburgh in Leitch v. 
Leydon. As I will show in the next section, it is being actionable per se in English law that 
sets it aside from the law in America. This difference could prove a large stumbling block 
when it comes to the potential incorporation of cyber trespass into English law. 
It is worth noting here that the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 has gathered 
together all the various tortuous property offences (such as trespass to chattels and 
conversion) under the umbrella term of wrongful interference. This act only deals with 
procedural aspects of the law such as remedies. It doesn’t change the offences themselves58
 
 
and the old case law and definitions of the various offences remain the correct law. 
 
 
                                                 
55 Rogers (2002) 
56 “Trespass is actionable per se, i.e. the act of trespass is itself a tort and it is not necessary to prove that it 
has caused actual damage.” Supra number 51 
57 Deakin et al (1999) pg 407 as quoted in Wong (2007) 
58 Except for the abolishment of the offence of detinue in Section 2 of the act 
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3.1.2 US law 
 
A good summary of the law on trespass to chattels in America can be found in the 
Restatement (second) of torts (1965) section 217. This states: 
 
 A trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally 
(a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or 
(b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another. 
 
Where intermeddling means “intentionally bringing about a physical contact with the 
chattel”. However trespass to chattels is only actionable where there has been some 
“damage” as defined by section 218 of the restatement: 
 
 
“One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to the possessor of 
the chattel if, but only if, 
(a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or 
(b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or 
(c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, 
or 
(d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person 
or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.” 
 
Compare this to the state of the English law above. As I mentioned there the requirement 
for damage is a striking difference between the two systems. I will discuss the importance 
of this difference after I have laid out the law on cyber trespass.  
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3.2 Cyber- trespass 
 
“[W]hat we are now observing in the context of the Internet is not only a new form 
of proprietary interest, but no less than the emergence of a new form of intellectual 
property, with only the most tenuous of antecedents in the law of chattels.”59
 
 
It was in relation to telecommunications that trespass to chattels was first used to deal with 
technological issues. In Thrifty Tel v. Bezeneck60 the plaintiffs were held to be liable under 
trespass61
 
 after hacking into the long distance telephone network of thrifty. It is this case 
that lays down the foundations for all other further uses of the law to deal with networks 
and computer systems. There were obviously hurdles which had to be jumped before a 
claim would work. Firstly what property is being trespassed upon, and how this has been 
subject to physical contact. Secondly there is the need under US law for damage to be 
found before it is actionable (section 218), this could prove difficult when it comes to 
electronic technology and depends on how broadly damage is to be interpreted by the 
courts. 
The courts in thrifty decided that the chattel that was being trespassed upon was the phone 
network62, this brought trespass to chattels into play. The problem then was the physical 
contact. There was no physical contact by the plaintiffs to the network. They didn’t go to 
an old fashioned telephone exchange and start moving wires around themselves; they were 
doing it from afar trying to get into the system by “phreaking”63
                                                 
59 Burke (1999) pg 2 
. The courts decided that 
the electronic signals that the plaintiffs were creating and “touching” Thrifty’s network 
were “sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action”. In this case the idea of 
60 Thrifty Tel v. Bezeneck 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 
61 Incidentally Thrifty was originally trying to prove conversion, but it was the courts that substituted the 
conversion claim for one of trespass to chattels. So this whole body of law started in a case where the 
claimants were not intending to rely upon it. 
62 I briefly discuss whether trespass to land would have been a better tort to base this on. This is in section 
4.3. 
63 A portmanteaux word created from “phone” and “freak”. For more information see 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phreaking> 
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damage was given only a cursory mention, but was held to be apparent from the facts so 
the claim succeeded. The idea of damage was, however, to be further discussed in 
subsequent cases. 
 
This case was followed by the Ohio courts in the first case which dealt directly with 
computers and computer networks. This was as a response to spam and was before the US 
CAN-SPAM Act (2003) can into force which provides custom built legal protection against 
spam. In Compuserve v. Cyber Promotions64 Compuserve sued Cyber Promotions for 
damages after they had sent a multitude of spam emails to its customers. The court 
followed the reasoning in Thrifty when it comes to the physical contact that trespass 
necessitates, electronic signals are enough to constitute such a touching. The damage here 
was, controversially, not just to the system that was touched. The court decided that the 
damage could have been a couple of things. Firstly the extra burden that was being placed 
on Compuserve’s system, this used up network space, processing power, and memory. This 
finding was based on section 218(b) of the restatement, that the chattel (the computer 
system) had been impaired as to its “condition, quality, or value”. It was held that the 
claimant need not show that the physical condition of the chattel was impaired, merely the 
value of it as a whole.65 However, more controversially, it was also held that the plaintiffs 
could claim for the loss of working hours trying to block the unwanted spam, along with 
any other costs involved in that protection. The loss of customer goodwill was also 
“damage” as per the restatement. These last aspects of the decision were questionable as 
their proximity to the trespass claim is doubtful. The whole reasoning behind damage has 
been criticised by many in the academic world especially from Dan Burke in his article 
“The problem with trespass”.66
 
 
“If such examples as I have suggested begin to sound a bit silly, that should perhaps 
indicate the degree of regard properly paid to the “trespass” of electrons upon 
computers intentionally connected to a network known to carry such electrons. The 
                                                 
64 Compuserve v. Cyber Promotions 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) 
65 Compuserve v. Cyber Promotions, per Graham, District Judge at 1021-1022 
66 Burke (1999)  
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Restatement test guards against such trivial contacts by requiring that the contact 
rise to the level of some substantial interference equivalent to physical seizure of 
the chattel or similar deprivation of its use. This may occur if the chattel is damaged 
or impaired as to its condition, quality or value. But in the case of Cyber 
Promotion’s “impinging electrons,” ... the physical contact with the equipment is of 
course too slight to constitute seizure or deprivation, or cause damage.”67
 
 
There has been a whole raft of similar cases going through the courts in America since the 
groundbreaking Compuserve decision. The most notable being eBay v. Bidders Edge,68 a 
number of cases involving America Online (AOL)69 and Register.com, Inc v. Verio, Inc70. 
All of which have had to grapple with the idea of what constitutes damage. In doing so they 
have managed to come to some rather dubious decisions. But it is clear that the policy 
reasons for finding trespass to chattels in these claims are persuasive. In the eBay case 
Bidders Edge was using a web spider to crawl through the eBay auction site to create its 
own service based on eBay’s auctions. They had tried to negotiate a license with eBay, but 
this was refused and Bidders Edge went on to crawl eBay’s site regardless. Here it was 
clear that the courts wanted to dissuade other “free-riders” from making money out of 
someone else’s work (in this case eBay’s popular auction website).71
                                                 
67 Burke (1999), Pg 9-10. He goes on to suggest that following the logic to its conclusion there could be cause 
for the creation of the law of “trespass to toasters” insofar as they can be (really) damaged by a surge of 
electrons through the power grid. Here there would be touching of property by flowing electrons (following 
Compuserve and Thrifty) regardless of the fact that that is the purpose of the grid and the toaster. 
 In Register.com the 
plaintiff was trying to stop the defendant (Verio) from using its WHOIS database without 
permission by sending lots of emails requesting information. This was after they had tried 
68 eBay v. Bidders Edge 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
69 America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F.Supp.2d 548 (E.D.Va.1998); America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 
F.Supp.2d 444 (E.D.Va.1998); America Online, Inc .v. Prime Data Systems, Inc., 1998 WL 34016692 (E.D.Va. 
Nov.20,1998). 
70 Register.com, inc. v. Verio, inc. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
71 How this decision would affect the myriad of price comparison sites is up for discussion here. For example 
sites which compare car insurance prices from different insurance companies requiring the user to fill in just 
one form. They use similar methods as Bidder’s Edge to conglomerate the information. This could arguably 
result in a claim under trespass in the US, but I doubt that it would be in the interests of any of the 
insurance companies. Basically it is a new way of gaining customers and should be viewed as being 
advantageous rather than as a bad thing. 
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to negotiate a license to use the database but had been rejected. The AOL cases dealt with 
spam (again before the CAN-SPAM Act) and again there is good policy reason to find in 
favour of the plaintiff. All of these cases effectively came to the just conclusion for the 
case, but have left a somewhat controversial and patchy set of precedents for further cases.  
 
The final case in the creation of cyber trespass is Intel v. Hamidi72. This case involved an 
unhappy employee (Hamidi) of Intel who, after leaving the company73, started a campaign 
against them. He would send current employees emails telling them how he had been 
treated by Intel. In the first instance the court followed the previous cases on point and this 
was held to be a trespass. Although Intel was not a service provider so the emails on the 
system couldn’t affect customer goodwill the time taken by the employees to sift through 
Hamidi’s (not too frequent) emails was held to be enough to find damage. Staff also took 
some time to try and block Hamidi’s emails. This along with the inevitable using of 
computer memory and processing cycles was held by the courts to amount to damage and 
thus a trespass. This case, unlike the previous ones, didn’t really have a good policy reason 
for the decision. The emails weren’t anywhere near the quantities of the other Spam 
cases74
 
. There were no unfair business practices, no loss of reputation, and no real 
additional strain on Intel’s system. The fairly small volume of emails was of no real 
consequence to the memory or processing abilities of the Intel’s network. On appeal the 
California Supreme Court went some way to restricting the applicability of trespass to 
chattels to the digital networked environment. The court gave very succinct summary of the 
judgement which is worth quoting in full: 
“After reviewing the decisions analyzing unauthorized electronic contact with 
computer systems as potential trespasses to chattels, we conclude that under 
California law the tort does not encompass, and should not be extended to 
encompass, an electronic communication that neither damages the recipient 
                                                 
72 Intel corp. v. Hamidi First decision: 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (2002), reversed by: 30 Cal. 4th 1342 (2003) 
73 Either fired <http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9905/03/emaillaw.idg/index.html> or left due to 
work related injury <http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/19395.html>.  
74 There were six mail shots over a period of 2 years. Intel v. Hamidi per Werdegar, J. at 1346 
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computer system nor impairs its functioning. Such an electronic communication 
does not constitute an actionable trespass to personal property, i.e., the computer 
system, because it does not interfere with the possessor’s use or possession of, or 
any other legally protected interest in, the personal property itself... The 
consequential economic damage Intel claims to have suffered, i.e., loss of 
productivity caused by employees reading and reacting to Hamidi’s messages and 
company efforts to block the messages, is not an injury to the company’s interest in 
its computers—which worked as intended and were unharmed by the 
communications—any more than the personal distress caused by reading an 
unpleasant letter would be an injury to the recipient’s mailbox, or the loss of 
privacy caused by an intrusive telephone call would be an injury to the recipient’s 
telephone equipment.”75
 
 
This decision has attempted to reign in the scope of cyber trespass in the US courts. 
Although, obviously not binding precedent in the other states, it is a persuasive argument 
and arguably correct interpretation of the law. Only damage to the computer system itself 
can lead to an action in trespass. As Burke puts it “employees are not chattels”76
 
. Further it 
would appear that any use of memory or processing cycles must actually cause some 
impairment to the system. If it is merely negligible (as was the case with Intel’s system) 
then it cannot amount to a trespass. This seems to bring cyber trespass back in line with the 
law as set out by the restatement of torts.  
All of the above cases have dealt with email or screen scraping. The situation I am looking 
at is slightly different. The situation involving SecuROM and other similar DRMS involve 
the secret installation of software. This type of compliant has been the subject of some later 
cases; most notably Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC77
                                                 
75 Intel v. Hamidi per Werdegar, J. at 1347 
. This case involved the secret bundling 
76 Burke (1999) pg 11 
77 Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC 384 F.Supp.2d 1219 (N.D.Ill. 2005). See also Thomas Kerrins v. Intermix 
Media, Inc. No. 2: 05-cv-05408-RGK-SS (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2006). Both of these cases are preliminary hearings 
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and installation of spyware78 with legitimately downloaded software. This was the first 
case to involve a private user’s computer rather than a large network system. The Illinois 
court decided that this made no difference to the claim, which makes sense. There is no 
conceivable reason why trespass can only be against a large network. In response to the 
plaintiffs’ request for dismissal of the claim of trespass the courts used the Compuserve 
reasoning when it came to deciding what constitutes damage79
 
. So using internet 
connection, processing cycles, and memory is enough to impair the system. Putting this 
together with the court’s reasoning behind ignoring Intel as persuasive it would appear that 
the test for damage is thus: The damage caused must be to the computer system, not to 
other incidental objects (employees). It must also be real and noticeable, not so 
insignificant to make no difference to the performance of the system in question. 
But most importantly it held that the secret bundling of spyware onto a private user’s 
computer can amount to a trespass (as long as there is damage). This is directly analogous 
to the example I have used with computer game DRMS and SecuROM in particular. 
Although this secretly bundled program comes on a game disc rather than downloaded over 
the internet, this should make no difference when it comes to damage under trespass, but 
may cause a problem when it comes to the physical touching, this I will discuss in the next 
paragraph. However, once more, there are strong policy reasons behind this decision. 
Spyware is a bad thing and any means to help get rid of it is most welcome. But this can’t 
really be said about DRMS. They are not programs which are there to spy on people and 
help direct advertising (or worse). They are there to protect the intellectual property of the 
rights holder. There have to be questions over whether the court would have agreed with 
the plaintiffs in the Sotelo case if it was a DRMS rather than spyware. Would the court 
have come to the same decision if the activity claimed over wasn’t as abhorrent as 
spyware?  
                                                                                                                                                    
where the courts dismissed the defendants’ claims to dismiss. There have been no final rulings at the time 
of my writing. 
78 In his article Mathias Klang gives a good 4 point definition of spyware. Klang (2003) pg 314 
79 It dismissed the relevance of Intel v. Hamidi on the basis that there was no measurable impairment of 
Intel’s system. 
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Another potential problem with using cyber trespass for the DRMS situation is the lack of a 
physical connection between the two parties. The reasoning behind allowing cyber trespass 
in America is that the flow of electrons is enough to count as physically touching the 
chattel. This reasoning is somewhat fluffy. As I have mentioned before the reason for this 
fluffy logic was most likely due to policy reasons, stopping an unwanted behaviour from 
continuing. But as Burke has argued it is stretching the definition of physical to its very 
limit80. It could arguably need stretching even more when the software complained of is 
stored on a disc rather than coming down the network wires. There is no physical 
connection for the electronic signals to travel down between the two systems. There is 
never a direct physical link from the plaintiff to the claimant. This leads to the question 
over whether trespass to chattels can be indirect. Whether putting a program on a disc and 
then the user installing the contents of that disc onto their computer can amount to a 
trespass within the wording of the law. The actual software that is being placed on the 
computer is directly analogous to the spyware example from Sotelo, but the method of 
administering the program is not. The US law in the Restatement of Torts explicitly says 
that the trespass can be indirect, for example throwing an object deliberately to damage the 
chattel81
 
. This would suggest that an indirect physical intermeddling such as using a disc 
would fit within this definition. Unfortunately there is no case law on this matter, it will 
have to be decided upon in the SecuROM cases involving EA if they ever get to court, but 
as of now there is no precedent. In my opinion, although there is no direct physical contact 
it would seem unjust to only be able to apply cyber trespass where there is the direct 
internet link. The analogy of throwing an object to damage a chattel is valid in this 
situation. 
 
                                                 
80 See above no. 67 
81 Comment e. of Restatement (second) of Torts s.217. 
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3.3 Incorporation into English law? 
 
As I have discussed above trespass in English law is likely to be actionable per se, that is 
no damage needs to be proven for a remedy to be awarded. This is not the case in American 
law. Originally the damage requirement for cyber trespass was interpreted very (too) 
widely to include any use of a computer system whether there was actually an impairment. 
It could also include loss of employee time and goodwill of customers. This has been 
severely reined in by Hamidi to require actual damage or impairment to the computer 
system only. This will restrict the scope of cyber trespass considerably. If the previous 
cyber trespass cases followed Hamidi it is doubtful that they would all have succeeded. For 
instance Bidders Edge’s crawling and screen scraping of eBay wasn’t having a real 
detrimental effect to eBay’s computer system. Register.com’s system wasn’t being 
impaired by Verio’s WHOIS requests; the system was designed to be searched in that way. 
Staff time was being used up, but this shouldn’t count towards damage for trespass. The 
spam cases are the only ones which are likely to have succeeded as spam can have a real 
detrimental effect on a computer system’s usability. However, in America at least, trespass 
to chattels is unlikely to be used for these cases since the inception of the CAN-SPAM act. 
 
Without the damage requirement in English law there would be a real problem that cyber 
trespass would overreach. The number of situations where it would be potentially 
applicable would be far too many to be practical. For instance search engine bots crawling 
over websites, categorising them for future searches. These cause no harm, but arguably 
there is a trespass per se. The same goes for price comparison sites. To stop trespass to 
chattels overreaching and causing a lot of harmless activities becoming unlawful the 
damage requirement is needed to limit the scope of the law. English law would need to find 
some other limiting factor to keep cyber trespass under control if it were to follow the US 
example. For this reason cyber trespass would be an unwelcome addition to the English 
law.  
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Where the American law doesn’t mention the need for a direct contact, just a physical one, 
it would appear from the definition of the English law that this may not be the case in 
England. The definition in the Oxford legal dictionary calls for a “wrongful direct 
interference with... goods”82
 
. But to what does “direct” refer? Does the interference (the 
“unauthorized touching”) have to be direct in that the physical contact has to be direct? 
Does there have to be any direct physical connection between the plaintiff and claimants 
property?  In which case trespass to chattels would struggle to apply to DRMS situations in 
English law where there is no direct touching by electrons. Or does it simply mean that the 
impairment has to be direct, in which case the state of the law is similar in this regard to the 
American law and cyber trespass would still be possible in cases where discs are involved. 
This potential problem is not as serious as the issues surrounding damage that I have 
described above. It doesn’t stop trespass to chattels being used in England to deal with 
similar cases such as the American cases. It would however, potentially make it not 
applicable to the DRMS scenario I have outlined. But it wouldn’t be beyond the scope of 
judicial creativity to reinterpret the law in such a way. 
So, overall, cyber trespass does have some positive aspects. Since the Intel decision it has 
been brought under control to make a practically applicable law that deals with the 
situations well. Whatever its theoretical background it is a good law that should be 
commended. It would not, however, be a good idea to incorporate it into the English  
system with the law on trespass to chattels as it currently is. The damage aspect of English 
law is a large barrier which I would suggest would be insurmountable. Cyber trespass 
without the limiting factor of requiring damage would not be good law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 Above, no. 51 
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4 The Alternatives 
 
There are alternatives to incorporating a trespass to chattels approach into the English 
system. I will look at alternatives under criminal law first and then mention some options 
under contract law. I will also look at possible alternate torts that a cyber trespass type law 
could be based on. After that I will suggest that rather than using cyber trespass the English 
system should amend the computer misuse  act (which I will look at below) to include 
some tortuous liability as well as criminal liability. As I will show, the fact that the 
computer misuse act only deals with criminal liability is its major weakness as an 
alternative to cyber trespass. 
 
4.1 Criminal Law 
 
Originally criminal damage was applicable to any damage caused to a computer, be it 
physical damage or damage to the workings of the computer. Criminal damage is set out in 
section 1 of the Criminal Damage act 1971: 
 
“A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging 
to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to 
whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an 
offence.” 
 
 36 
Section 10 of the act sets out what is to be considered as property with regards to criminal 
damage. Unlike with theft83, property is restricted to tangible property, be it real or 
personal,84 so it can be land but not something intangible or a “thing in action”. The cases 
of Cox v. Riley85 and R v. Whiteley86
 
 made it clear that this didn’t mean damage to 
computer data was outside of the scope of the act. Rather, that the damage itself didn’t have 
to be tangible as long as the property that was damaged was tangible. So in terms of 
criminal damage and computer data the damage is done to the physical object, the 
computer, by damaging the intangible aspect of it, the data held on the computer. However 
this was all made immaterial by section 3(6) of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 which 
specifies that: 
“For the purposes of the [1971 c. 48.] Criminal Damage Act 1971 a modification of 
the contents of a computer shall not be regarded as damaging any computer or 
computer storage medium unless its effect on that computer or computer storage 
medium impairs its physical condition.”87
 
 
This provision has now been moved to section 10 of the Criminal Damage Act following 
the Police and Justice Act 2006 schedule 14. This act amended the Computer Misuse Act 
quite considerably, which I will come to now. 
 
 
4.1.1 Computer Misuse Act 1990 
 
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 was created to provide protection for computers and 
computer networks from hackers and other computer crime. An increasing problem at a 
time when computing was beginning to take off. There are two main crimes which are 
                                                 
83 Theft Act 1969 s.4 
84 S.10 Criminal Damage Act 
85 Cox v. Riley (1986)83 Cr. App.R.54 
86 R v. Whiteley (Nicholas Alan) (1991)93 Cr. App. R. 25 
87 S.3(6) Computer Misuse Act 1991 before amended by Police and Justice Act 2006 
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covered by the act; unauthorised access to a computer system88 and unauthorised 
modification of computer material89. There is also a third offence which is unauthorised 
access with intent to commit a further offence, in essence an aggravated form of the s.1 
offence.90
 
 I will now look at each of the offences in turn, starting with a brief look at s.1 
and then a more detailed look at the s.3 offence. 
4.1.1.1 Computer Misuse Act s.1 
 
Many programs “phone home” to their creators with information about the system which 
they are being used on. This can be used by the company in a multitude of ways, for 
instance research on what systems people are using their programs are on, or, in the case of 
a lot of DRMS, to help in the fight against piracy. For instance the SecuROM system can 
be set up to “phone home” and includes in these “calls” certain pieces of potentially 
personal data such as IP address and other facts about the system that it is being used on, 
such as the operating system. 
 
Section 1 of the computer misuse act governs unauthorised access to a computer system. 
This has also been amended by the Police and Justice Act 2006, Section 35. I have set the 
provision out below [with the 2006 amendments]: 
 “(1) A person is guilty of an offence if—  
(a) he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure 
access to any program or data held in any computer [or to enable any such 
access to be secured];  
                                                 
88 S.1 Computer Misuse Act 
(b) the access he intends to secure [or enable to be secured] is unauthorised; 
and  
89 S.3 Computer Misuse Act. This has now been replaced by section 36 of the Police and Justice Act 2006, 
which has created the offence of unauthorised acts with intent to impair operation of computer, etc. I will 
discuss this amendment below. 
90 S.2 Computer Misuse Act  
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(c) he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the 
function that that is the case.  
(2) The intent a person has to have to commit an offence under this section need not 
be directed at—  
(a) any particular program or data;  
(b) a program or data of any particular kind; or  
(c) 
 
a program or data held in any particular computer.” 
The purpose behind this provision is to protect computer systems from hacking. It is 
worded in such a way to cover access without any further actions91
 
. However it has a 
broader scope than simply protecting against the archetypal hacker, that is someone sitting 
at home with a personal computer, whether with malicious intent or not. It can go further to 
protect any unauthorised access to computer data which means it can potentially be used 
with reference to perfectly legitimate computer programs phoning home with data. It is 
clear that there is access to data held on the computer, for instance details on the operating 
system and the computer’s IP address. The next thing that would need to be proved was 
authorisation or otherwise. If there was included in the license agreement pertaining to the 
program a clause which sets out that the program is likely to phone home and with what 
information then there would be authorisation and there would be no offence. An example 
would be section 4 of the Spore End User Licensing Agreement (EULA) which states that: 
“4. Consent to Use of Data. To facilitate technical protection measures, the 
provision of software updates and any dynamically served content, and product 
support and other services to you, including online play, you agree that EA and its 
affiliates may collect, use, store and transmit technical and related information that 
identifies your computer (including an Internet Protocol Address and hardware 
identification), operating system and application software and peripheral hardware. 
                                                 
91 This is covered by Section 2 of the act; unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission 
of further offences. 
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EA and its affiliates may also use this information in the aggregate, in a form which 
does not personally identify you, to improve our products and services and we may 
share anonymous aggregate data with our third party service providers.” 
 
Section 2 of the act provides for stricter penalties if the unauthorised access was done with 
the intent to go on and commit a further offence, this further offence must be punishable by 
more than 5 years imprisonment92
 
. There is no scope for this to be used in any 
circumstance that I am looking at. 
4.1.1.2 The Old Computer Misuse Act s.3 
 
Before it was replaced by the new section 3 offence by the Police and Justice Act 2006 
section 3 of the Computer Misuse act set out the offence of “unauthorised modification of 
computer material”93
 
: 
“(1) A person is guilty of an offence if—  
(a) he does any act which causes an unauthorised modification of the 
contents of any computer; and  
(b) at the time when he does the act he has the requisite intent and the 
requisite knowledge.  
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above the requisite intent is an intent to 
cause a modification of the contents of any computer and by so doing—  
(a) to impair the operation of any computer;  
(b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer; 
or  
                                                 
92 Section 2(2) 
93 I am mentioning this because the new offence came into force in October 2008, after the use of SecuROM 
in some cases, thus making this the applicable law rather than the new offence. There is also substantial 
overlap between the two offences. The new offence expands on this offence, but anything that was 
unlawful under the old law will still be caught by the new offence. 
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(c) to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any such 
data.  
(3) The intent need not be directed at—  
(a) any particular computer;  
(b) any particular program or data or a program or data of any particular 
kind; or  
(c) any particular modification or a modification of any particular kind.  
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) above the requisite knowledge is 
knowledge that any modification he intends to cause is unauthorised.  
(5) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether an unauthorised 
modification or any intended effect of it of a kind mentioned in subsection (2) 
above is, or is intended to be, permanent or merely temporary.” 
 
The questions that have to be asked are, firstly was there a modification of a computer 
system, and was this modification unauthorised (s(1)(a)). The second aspect that would 
need to be proved is that there was intent and knowledge on behalf of the accused.  
 
For the first question s17 on interpretation is of great help. S17(7) states that: 
A modification of the contents of any computer takes place if, by the operation of 
any function of the computer concerned or any other computer—  
(a) any program or data held in the computer concerned is altered or erased; 
or  
(b) any program or data is added to its contents;
and any act which contributes towards causing such a modification shall be 
regarded as causing it. 
  
So, for instance, placing a program on a computer would fit as a modification to the system 
17(7)(b). This has to be done using that computer, or another computer, which would seem 
to cover all areas. Authorisation is also dealt with under s17 of the act, more specifically 
s17(8): 
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 Such a modification is unauthorised if—  
(a) the person whose act causes it is not himself entitled to determine 
whether the modification should be made; and  
(b) he does not have consent to the modification from any person who is so 
entitled.
As Neil MacEwan puts it: “If the accused was not entitled to control the process in question 
(access or modification/impairment), and did not have the consent of someone who was, 
the requisite lack of authority is established.”
  
94 This is a simple test of authority that would 
exist in any realm of life, be it electronic or with regards to real property.95
 
 
So any change to a computer without consent would fit under this provision. In the case 
with the SecuROM software, there was no disclosure that the program was a separate third 
party piece of software so there could be no consent from the users of the computers that 
became “infected” by the software. There could be an argument over implied consent, 
giving that there is notice of a DRMS being used by the Spore game, therefore the user has 
consented to DRMSs being utilised. But since there is nothing to tell the user that it is not 
actually part of the game which is being installed, but a stand-alone program which installs 
itself at the very heart of the system, then I think that this line of argument would, and 
should, ultimately fail. Here it is useful to use the analogy from the comment on DPP v. 
Bignall96: “
 
If I give you permission to enter my study for the purpose of reading my books, 
your entering to drink my sherry would surely be an unauthorised "access" to the room as 
well as to the sherry.” The user may give authorisation for the use of DRMS to protect a 
company’s intellectual property, but it doesn’t follow that this authorisation is for the 
installation of a stand-alone program which is placed at the heart of the computer system 
and cannot be (easily) uninstalled even if the game is uninstalled. 
                                                 
94 MacEwan (2008) pg 957 
95 For an in depth discussion of the meaning of authorisation see Kerr (2003) 
96 DPP v. Bignall [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. 1 
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The second aspect that needs to be proved is the mens rea, namely intention and 
knowledge. As per S3(4) above, knowledge must be that the act was unauthorised. If there 
is no disclosure by a company of extra software then it follows that there must be 
knowledge that the modification is unauthorised. Intention is much harder to find following 
the wording of the act. The intention must be to make a modification, which again is easy 
to find in cases such as the SecuROM example. There is a definite intention to install the 
DRMS without the consent of the users, thus satisfying both knowledge and intent thus far. 
However there it would appear that there must also be intent to go on and cause a further 
act. The three actions which must be intended can be basically summarised as impairing the 
functionality of the computer. Computers can easily be impaired following the installation 
of software, authorised or unauthorised, but the intent will rarely, if ever, be there. The 
intention of DRMSs is to protect intellectual property by stopping piracy. The Vista 
example above is to stop the copying of protected High Definition music and videos; with 
DRMSs attached to computer games, amongst other things, to stop the games being shared 
online. There should (hopefully) be no intention to impair the use of the users’ computer, 
whether this happens to be a side effect or not. So an honest company (honest in terms of 
the intention of their protection simply to protect) will not be liable under the old section 3 
of the Computer Misuse Act. 
 
There are also some problems when it comes to defining what an impairment is. Does it 
require some catastrophic system failure or a small drop in performance? Or more likely 
somewhere in between? Judicial thoughts on this matter have been lacking from the body 
of case law on this subject. In the American law of trespass to chattels it would appear that 
simply using up some of the processing power of the computer is enough to lead to liability 
through the tort97
                                                 
97 See my discussion in 3.2 
. This has lead to quite a wide definition of impairment which includes a 
noticeable drop in performance. Since the Computer Misuse Act sets down criminal 
liability it is not unreasonable to expect there to be a higher threshold than in tort law. 
There are already such principles enshrined in the law of criminal damage. The damage 
caused for criminal damage to be found must be more than de minimus; that is more than 
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negligible. In Morphitis v. Salmon98 for example a scratch on a scaffolding pole was held 
not to constitute criminal damage as it didn’t affect the usefulness of property. If such a 
principle was used by the courts to decide if any intended impairment was enough to lead 
to a liability under the Computer Misuse Act then simply using processing cycles and 
memory should not be enough. Unless there are many programs that have been installed or 
the program is particularly resource hungry it would be unreasonable to infer criminal 
liability there from. In, for example, the SecuROM example there is evidence that the 
program has caused all sorts of havoc to users systems including restricting access to 
perfectly lawful programs already installed99
 
. This, in my opinion, would be more than a 
minimal interference and therefore liability should be able to arise under those 
circumstances. 
4.1.1.3 Computer Misuse Act s.3 as amended by Police and Justice Act 2006 
 
This section was replaced in the Police and Justice act to protect computer systems from 
denial of service attacks. These are attacks which overload a system with data so it can no 
longer function properly. There was disagreement over whether these would fall under the 
old section 3. In fact in the case of DPP v. Lennon100
                                                 
98 Morphitis v. Salmon [1990] Crim. L.R. 48 
 the court of first instance decided that 
a denial of service attack perpetrated by sending millions of emails was not contrary to 
section 3. The (somewhat flawed) logic behind the decision was that since the company 
that was attacked had an email server which was to deal with incoming and outgoing 
emails then it was not an unauthorised act to send the company emails. To extend this 
authorisation to purposefully sending millions of emails with the intent to disable the 
network would seem absurd. The case was later appealed and sent back to the courts to be 
99 This also brings up the causation and the need for evidence to prove that the damage/impairment was 
actually caused by the company’s actions. Problems with users’ computers could merely coincide with the 
installation of the software in question but not be caused by it. This is a question of fact that would have to 
be decided on a case by case basis and cannot be satisfactorily answered in this piece. 
100 DPP v. Lennon [2006] EWHC 1201 (Admin) 
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reheard, but the confusion over the status of denial of service attacks was enough to get the 
government to review the law and make the following amendments. 
 
Section 3 now outlines the offence of “unauthorised acts with the intent to impair, or with 
recklessness to impairing, operation of a computer, etc.” The full text of the section is as 
follows: 
 
 (1) A person is guilty of an offence if—  
(a) he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer;  
(b) at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and  
(c) either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies.  
(2) This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act—  
(a) to impair the operation of any computer;  
(b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer;  
(c) to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any such 
data; or  
(d) to enable any of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) above to be 
done.  
(3) This subsection applies if the person is reckless as to whether the act will do any 
of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (2) above.  
(4) The intention referred to in subsection (2) above, or the recklessness referred to 
in subsection (3) above, need not relate to—  
(a) any particular computer;  
(b) any particular program or data; or  
(c) a program or data of any particular kind.
 
” 
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The actus reus of this new offence is now simply doing an unauthorised act to a computer. 
This is simpler than the old actus reus of needing to have modified the computer in some 
way. This means that this new section has a broader scope which encompasses all the cases 
which would have fallen under the old offence, but will also include more situations, as the 
government intended. Looking at the situation in question, as I showed that it fitted into the 
old section then there will be no problem when it comes to applying the new section. 
Installing a program is doing an act, and as stated above this act can be unauthorised if 
there isn’t proper disclosure as to the nature of the installation. 
  
The main relevant difference between this offence and the old one is the mens rea of the 
offence. Knowledge is still there, but now, as well as intention, recklessness will suffice to 
make a party liable. As with above there still won’t be any intention for the same reasons. 
Companies will not be making programs which are intended to stop their customers' 
computers from working. But the inclusion of recklessness in the new provision has opened 
a potentially more promising avenue. The addition of recklessness to the new offence was 
last minute and makes the scope far broader than if it was not included. With MacEwan 
suggesting that “[t]his [inclusion of recklessness] could prove to be a costly example of 
legislative overkill.”101
 
  
There used to be two forms of recklessness; Caldwell102 (objective recklessness) and 
Cunningham103 (subjective recklessness). A full discussion of the history and development 
wouldn’t add anything to this thesis so I will go straight to the law as it is now. That current 
law is from the case R v. G and another104
 
 and the test is: 
                                                 
101 MacEwan (2008) pg 964 
"A person is reckless if--(a) knowing that there is a risk that an event may result 
from his conduct or that a circumstance may exist, he takes that risk, and (b) it is 
102 R v. Caldwell (James) [1982] A.C. 341 
103 R v. Cunningham (Roy) [1957] 2 Q.B. 396 
104 R v. G and another [2004] 1 A.C. 1034 
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unreasonable for him to take it having regard to the degree and nature of the risk 
which he knows to be present."105
 
 
Relating this to s.3 of the Computer Misuse Act that I have been describing, for a person to 
be guilty of the offence they must see a risk that their unauthorised act could lead to an 
impairment under s.3(2). In the case of the situation I have been dealing with there is 
obviously a risk that a computer will be slowed down by the DRMS. But as I have 
suggested above this shouldn’t be enough for criminal liability to arise. There would have 
to be knowledge of a risk of some real impairment of a computer system. For example 
some of the problems that users have encountered from SecuROM (CD drives not 
functioning etc). So for a case to be proved there would have to be some foreseeable risk 
that these effects could happen. Issues could come up in testing that would lead to a 
foreseeable risk. There is always going to be a risk that something may go wrong, but again 
for criminal liability this would be unfair. I would argue that the specific effect should be 
foreseeable, for example the software maker must foresee the risk of CD drives not 
working etc. 
 
The final thing that needs to be discussed is the ability of a corporation to be held 
responsible for a criminal act. To this end I turn to Working Paper 44 from the law 
commission which deals with “Criminal Liability of Corporations”106. This neatly 
summarises the law on this issue. The general rule is that there are no legal barriers from 
bringing a criminal case against a company. Obviously there are certain offences that, due 
to their nature could never be committed by a company. The examples given in the 
working paper include rape, murder,107
                                                 
105 R v. G per Bingham LJ at 1047 
 and bigamy. However it is only the nature of the 
offences that would stop criminal liability of a company. Liability can be found in two 
106 Law Commission (1972) 
107 There is also no possibility for holding a company liable where the only punishment available is 
imprisonment, which obviously cannot be applicable to a company. The only criminal punishment available 
will be a fine. 
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ways, either through vicarious liability108
 
 or through personal liability, that is against the 
company as a legal person. It is the latter which is most use here.  
The actus reus of the offence is no more complex than if it was against an individual, and 
as I have shown above that has been satisfied in terms of s.3 of the Computer Misuse Act 
(as amended). The problems come with the mens rea, in the case in question recklessness. 
A company cannot have a sentient consciousness of its own. Its consciousness and 
therefore intention are made up of the sum of its constituent parts, its shareholders, 
directors, managers, and employees. So it needs to be proved that one of these constituent 
parts has the required mental state to commit the offence109
 
. The next question is of course 
who to pick to represent the consciousness of the incorporated body. Here we can look to 
case law to help us: 
"A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and 
nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and 
act in accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the 
company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the 
work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and 
managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company and control 
what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the 
company and is treated by the law as such.”110
  
 
This effectively restricts those able to give the company will to those at the top. That is 
managers and directors who steer the company and make the decisions which could lead to 
committing a criminal act. In the leading case of Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v. Nattrass111
                                                 
108 Holding a company responsible for the acts of an employee or agent during the course of their job. 
 it 
109 It is unclear as to whether having the mens rea split between employees would result in liability, for 
instance one employee having the requisite knowledge and another having the recklessness or intention to 
commit the accused crime. However, in the law commissions’ opinion this is unlikely to be the case. 
110 H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Graham & Sons Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B. 159, per Denning L.J. at 172 
111 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v. Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153 
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was held that even a branch manager could be the conduit through which liability could 
pass, although on the facts of the case it was held otherwise here.  
 
Could this allow for a computer games company to be held criminally liable under the 
Computer Misuse Act? That would depend on the how the company is set up. There needs 
to be at least one person in a position of authority who has the full mens rea for the offence. 
In terms of a computer games company (most likely the publisher as opposed to the 
developer as they will deal with the practical aspects of getting the game onto a disc and 
related jobs such as the copy protection) that person will likely either come from the legal 
department or from the publishing department. However the legal person in charge of the 
licensing and thus the lack of authorisation must also know the nature of the DRMS that is 
being used. That it is a stand alone, self installing piece of software that should have its 
own disclosure in the EULA. The publishing manager will know which DRMS is being 
used, but will he know what is, and what should be, included in the EULA? Obviously the 
answer will likely be different depending on the size and structure of the company. This 
area of uncertainty would make action under the Computer Misuse Act risky and therefore 
less suitable for use in such cases. 
 
Regardless, however, of the answer to the questions posed, this line of attack is unlikely to 
ever come to fruition. The offence itself, as perpetrated by mainstream companies selling 
reasonably cheap computer software to home users, is far from serious enough to get the 
state involved in prosecuting a company. The only remedy available would be a fine for the 
company involved, and depending on how the case is brought this could be a minimal. If it 
was decided that it was a single offence then the fine could only reach a maximum of 
£5000. If it is decided that each computer that has become broken is a separate offence then 
obviously the fine could be greater. But evidentially there would be a problem with what 
actually caused the impairment of the system. There is also going to be major issues with 
coming to an accurate number of people affected by the system which has caused the 
problem. Arguably there would more likely be a case brought if the victim was a large 
public body, or a series of large companies where the damage involved was massive (rather 
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than the seemingly insignificant amount for a home system). But in these cases contract 
law would likely be involved as with contracts that size there would inevitably be clauses 
regarding any damage. 
 
There would also be little to instigate a private prosecution from an individual, or group of 
individuals, using the criminal law. There would seem little point in going through the 
criminal courts, with the higher burden of proof, to get the company fined. The alternative 
would be to go through the civil system with its lower burden of proof and the prospect of 
compensation.  
 
In essence, using the Computer Misuse Act as a basis for liability has its positive points. 
The actus reus of the offence requires some real interference with the computer system in 
question. Although there is no case law yet on what would amount to an interference I have 
hypothesised that it should follow other criminal law provisions such as criminal damage. 
This should be a higher threshold than for civil liability under cyber trespass. This would 
be harder to prove than the damage test under Intel, which is a fair test under civil liability. 
So using Computer Misuse negates the potential problems with trespass to chattels being 
actionable per se. However the main drawback is the criminal liability that it is based on. 
This doesn’t provide the best remedies for the parties affected by unauthorised access such 
as I have described. The remedy that fits best is compensation for the loss which has been 
suffered. A better approach would be to allow civil liability within the actus reus of the 
offense under the computer misuse act. This will also allow for a lower threshold for 
damage, possibly along the same lines as the cyber trespass law. I will discuss this in more 
detail later. But it is suffice to say here that pursuing this approach through the criminal 
courts is not a good alternative to cyber trespass. 
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4.2 Contract Law 
4.2.1 Misrepresentation112
 
 
A misrepresentation is an “unambiguous false statement of facts which is addressed to the 
party misled and which induced that party to enter into a contract”113
 
. It is helpful to again 
split this into separate aspects which need to be satisfied to find a misrepresentation. These 
are (1) unambiguous (2) false (3) statement of facts (4) which induced that party to enter 
into a contract.  
There is no general duty in English contract law to disclose information114
In Arkwright v. Newbold
, but 
misrepresentation can arise if some information is given, but not the whole story. 
115 James LJ stated: “supposing you state a thing partially, you 
may make a false statement as much as if you misstated it altogether. Every word may be 
true, but if you leave something out which qualifies it you may make a false statement.”116 
Even more helpful for the problem in question is the case of Dimmock v. Hallett117
 
 where a 
farm was sold as fully tenanted. However the seller failed to disclose the fact that, although 
this was true at the time, the leases were not going to be renewed when they expired. It was 
held here that it was a misrepresentation as there was only a partial disclosure of the facts. 
If there had been no disclosure at all regarding the status of lease situation then there could 
have been no misrepresentation.  
This area of law can only be of use in certain circumstances depending on the companies’ 
use of the systems in question; it does not really affect the legality of the system itself, only 
its implementation. In the case with EA it was disclosed that there was a DRMS in use with 
                                                 
112 A full discussion on misrepresentation will not add too much to the discussion as it is not directly linked 
to the software being used, but the contract under which it is being released. For a full discussion see: 
McKendrick (2003) 
113 McKendrick (2003) pg 630 
114 Keates v. Cadogan (1851) 10 CB 591 
115 Arkwright v. Newbold (1881) 17 Ch D 301 
116 Arkwright v. Newbold per James LJ at 318 
117 Dimmock v. Hallet (1866) LR 2 Ch App 21 
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the Spore game. This was stated on the packaging, which also specifies the need to have an 
internet connection to register the game. It is also stated in a Q&A page on EA’s customer 
support website118
 
. There is no mention anywhere that the DRMS in question is a 
standalone program that will be installed onto the users system without their knowledge or 
authentication. Using the Dimmock case to illustrate this situation, revealing that a DRMS 
is being used with the game is akin to saying that the farm being sold is fully tenanted. 
However not revealing that this DRMS is in fact a separate program with the qualities 
which SecuROM has is not revealing that the leases have not been renewed. I would say, 
therefore that there has been a factual misrepresentation in such a situation as there has 
only been partial disclosure, the whole nature and quality of the system being used has not 
been disclosed to the purchaser of the program. Perversely, because it has been disclosed 
that there is some DRMS in use this leaves the company open to a claim under contract 
law. If they had not disclosed anything about the protection measures they have taken then 
there could be no action here. Since I have shown that there is a misrepresentation it must 
be shown that this induced the claimant into entering into a contract. In essence the 
question must be that if the customer knew that the DRMS being used was a standalone 
system which would run on their system at all times and would be uninstallable (as it was 
originally) or very hard to uninstall (as it is now) then would they have gone on to purchase 
the game? This is obviously a subjective question which would have to be decided on a 
case by case basis as different users would weigh up the options differently. But it is clear 
from some users’ comments and reviews on the game that they would not have bought the 
game if they had known the whole story. Others, following those comments have in fact 
gone on to not purchase the game. 
 
                                                 
118 Available at: <http://support.ea.com/cgi-
bin/ea.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_li=&p_sid=rapS**Ej&p_sp=&p_faqid=19743&p_iid=0&p_created=
&p_prod=&p_cat=&p_cv=&p_pv=&p_prods=&p_cats=&prod_lvl1=&prod_lvl2=&prod_lvl3=&cat_lvl1=&cat_
lvl2=&cat_lvl3=&p_hidden_prods=&p_search_text=&p_new_search=&p_accessibility=&p_page=&p_lva=19
743&nextlink>  
 52 
4.3 A New Approach? 
 
Cyber trespass has been based on the old law of trespass to chattels. But some have 
suggested that it seems more like the law on trespass to land119. The idea being that it could 
iron out some of the theoretical difficulties involved. Using trespass to land as a basis for 
governing unauthorised access to computers would involve granting real property rights to 
cyber space. This could be a counter-productive approach which could lead to restrictions 
on the internet which wouldn’t be beneficial to society as a whole 120
 
 . Although it could 
help with some of the theoretical problems with the current cyber trespass law it would 
cause some practical problems. Trespass to land is actionable per se in both England and 
the US, so basing the law on this would fail to iron out the damage issue in English law and 
would create a damage issue in the US. So overall, this approach would fail to improve on 
the weakness experienced by the trespass to chattels approach in English law and would 
make the situation even worse in the US. For these reasons I would contend that it would 
be a poor choice of laws on which to base such a doctrine as cyber trespass. It would not be 
worth the problems that creating real property rights in cyberspace would make as there 
would be no real practical benefit from it. 
 
Another alternative could be using the tort of nuisance as a better way forward The Oxford 
Law Dictionary defines nuisance as: “a tort, protecting occupiers of land from damage to 
the land, buildings, or vegetation or from unreasonable interference with their comfort or 
convenience by excessive noise, dust, fumes, smells, etc.”121
                                                 
119 See Burke (1999) 
 . This would again require 
computer systems to be classified as real property, which as I suggested above, would open 
a whole new can of worms. There is no such tort as nuisance to chattels. If the land aspect 
of nuisance could be avoided then this could be a promising avenue to follow. The 
120 This is a view held by Harold Smith Reeves in his article “Property in Cyberspace”, Reeves (1996). 
121 "nuisance n." A Dictionary of Law. by Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A. Martin. Oxford University Press 2009 
Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  Oslo University.  8 September 2009  
 <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t49.e2639> 
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“damage” that is caused in the unauthorised access cases which have lead to cyber trespass 
being adopted would feasibly count as a nuisance. They are an “unreasonable interference” 
with the computer users “comfort or convenience” (mainly here convenience).  
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5 Conclusion 
 
In this piece of work I have tried to show the strengths and weaknesses of the cyber 
trespass law created in America and have applied this to a real situation that is happening 
right now. The law of cyber trespass could be seen as an example of judicial overreaching. 
Taking an old legal rule and distorting it beyond recognition to deal with new technological 
situations. But since the decision in Intel v. Hamidi the law has been brought back into line 
with its origins. It is now a useful doctrine for the American system which deserves a place 
in the US body of law. However, I have also shown that the US law would not be suitable 
for incorporation into the English system as there are key differences between the 
underlying law of trespass to chattels. The damage requirement is the key difference which 
makes the cyber trespass rules incompatible and would lead to a very broad legal rule 
potentially covering too many digital situations. The possible problem with the American 
judges’ interpretation of touching is another potential problem, but not insurmountable due 
to the vagueness of the actual legal rules in England.  
 
The alternatives that I have suggested are quite mixed in their suitability. Trespass to land 
is a definite no go considering the implications of considering cyber space akin to real 
property. It also fails to deal with any of the pitfalls regarding damage that I have 
identified.  Nuisance would be a better fit, and in many ways cyber nuisance would have 
been a preferable doctrine rather than cyber trespass, but again there is the real property 
hurdle in the way. For it to work well there would need to be a tort of nuisance to chattels 
which doesn’t exist. Contract law is always going to be an option where there is a badly 
drafted EULA. It also has the ability to prescribe the correct remedies. But it is quite easy 
for a computer games publisher to avoid contractual liability by better drafting. This 
drafting could either negate all the issues with disclosure, therefore making unauthorised 
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access authorised, or could mean no disclosure at all. For this reason it’s not a great 
alternative to cyber trespass. Of the alternatives that exist at the moment the best is an 
action under Computer Misuse legislation. The main problem here being that criminal 
liability is not the ideal avenue in the situation I have described.  
 
The best way forward is always going to be a specifically created law to deal with the 
question at hand. But this is not normally practical due to the differences in the pace of law 
and technology. Both cyber trespass and Computer Misuse have their limitations. Cyber 
trespass has its slightly murky past to contend with along with the issues of incorporation 
into English law. The Computer Misuse Act seems to tick all the boxes when it comes to 
the actus reus. It would do a good job in the circumstances of the current DRMSs and its 
scope is broad enough to cover other uses of cyber trespass. However its weaknesses lie in 
the mens rea and criminal nature of the offence. The obvious way of answering this 
question would be to combine the two. Tortious liability could have and should have been 
written into the Computer Misuse Act when it was created. The actus reus of s.3 of the 
computer misuse act requires damage, which I have shown to be a real issue when it comes 
to unauthorised access situations. It would solve the problems with the Computer Misuse 
act and the unsuitability of its criminal sanctions. The problems that exist with the mens rea 
of s.3 of the Computer Misuse Act would also be solved by this solution. There are 
absolutely no issues with holding a company liable under tort.  The standard asked of is 
also lower when it comes to mens rea. Negligence or just mere knowledge of an 
unauthorised act to a computer will likely suffice which would be far more likely in these 
situations. The level of damage could also be reduced to the level of the American cyber 
trespass law after the Intel decision. As I discussed before, I would argue that criminal 
liability should be based on a higher level of damage. All things considered this would be a 
preferable solution to the issues that I have discussed rather than incorporating cyber 
trespass into the English system. It would also be a better solution than developing one of 
the other older torts to cover this area.  
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